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TAXATION  WITHOUT  LIMITATION:  THE  
PROHIBITED  PRETEXT  DOCTRINE  V.  THE  SEBELIUS  
THEORY  
Brett  W.  Hastings*  
INTRODUCTION  
In   the   words   of   Justice   Joseph   Story   “[t]he   Constitution   was,  
from  its  very  origin,  contemplated  to  be  the  frame  of  a  national  
government,   of   special   and   enumerated   powers,   and   not   of  
general   and   unlimited   powers.”1      The   idea   of   organizing   a  
central   government   with   limited   power   “in   [o]rder   to   form   a  
more  perfect  Union”2  between   sovereign   states,  was   radical   for  
the   day.3      Historically,   governments   had   been   centralized   and  
unchecked,  subject  only  to  those  limitations  they  saw  fit  to  place  
upon   themselves.4      In   contrast,   the   national   government   of   the  
United   States   is   granted   only   those   powers   enumerated   in   the  
Constitution,   with   all   other   powers   “reserved   to   the   States  
respectively,  or  to  the  people.”5  
It   is  undisputed   that   the  power  of   the  Federal  government  
has  vastly   expanded   in   the   last   century.6     Whether  you  believe  
this   expansive   role   to  be  good  or  bad,   there   is  one  overarching  
 
*  Brett  W.  Hastings.    B.S.,  Utah  State  University  (1991);  J.D.  candidate,  University  of  
Utah   S.J.   Quinney   College   of   Law   (anticipated   December   2014);   certified   public  
accountant,   entrepreneur,   scholar,   businessman,   husband,   and   father   of   two  
beautiful  children.      
   1.     1   JOSEPH   STORY,   COMMENTARIES   ON   THE   CONSTITUTION   OF   THE   UNITED  
STATES  641  (Thomas  M.  Cooley  ed.,  4th  ed.  Boston,  Little,  Brown  &  Co.  1873).  
   2.     U.S.  CONST.  pmbl.  
   3.     1  STORY,  supra  note  1,  at  205.  
   4.     Id.  
   5.     U.S.  CONST.  amend.  X;  1  STORY,  supra  note  1,  at  206.  
   6.     Randall  G.  Holcombe,  The  Growth  of  the  Federal  Government  in  the  1920s,  16  
CATO.  J  175,  175  (1996).  
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and  oft  debated  question:  Where  must  the  constitutional  line  be  
drawn   in   order   to   preserve   the   notion   of   a   government   of  
limited  and  enumerated  powers?  
BACKGROUND  
On  March  23,  2010,  President  Obama  signed  into  law  the  Patient  
Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act  (“ACA”).7     The  ACA  “aims  
to   increase   the   number   of   Americans   covered   by   health  
insurance   and  decrease   the   cost   of  health   care.”8      Following   its  
passage,   twenty-­‐‑six   states   challenged   various   provisions   of   the  
ACA.9      This  Article   focuses   on  one  of   those  provisions,   the   so-­‐‑
called   “individual   mandate,”   which   requires   that   “minimum  
essential”  health  care  insurance  be  purchased  and  maintained  by  
most   Americans.10      Those   failing   to   purchase   and   maintain  
minimum   health   insurance   coverage   are   required   to   make   a  
“shared  responsibility  payment”  to  the  Federal  government.11  
The  Government  posed  two  primary  theories  upon  which  it  
claimed   authority   to   enact   the   individual   mandate.12      First,  
failure  to  purchase  health  insurance  affects   interstate  commerce  
and   is   therefore   subject   to   federal   regulation   under   the  
Commerce   Clause.13      Second,   even   if   Commerce   Clause  
authority   was   lacking,   the   broad   power   of   taxation  
independently  rendered  the  individual  mandate  constitutional.14    
The   Supreme   Court   took   up   the   case   in   2012   and   a   divided  
Court  ruled  the  individual  mandate  constitutional,  holding  that  
the   individual   mandate   is   unsustainable   under   the   Commerce  
 
   7.     Patient   Protection   and  Affordable  Care  Act,   Pub.   L.  No.   111-­‐‑48,   124   Stat.  
119  (2010).  
   8.     Nat’l  Fed’n  of  Indep.  Bus.  v.  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  2566,  2580  (2012).  
   9.     Id.;   see   also   States’   Positions   in   the   Affordable   Care   Act   Case   at   the   Supreme  
Court,   HENRY   J.   KAISER   FAM.   FOUND.   (2012),   http://kff.org/health-­‐‑reform/state-­‐‑
indicator/state-­‐‑positions-­‐‑on-­‐‑aca-­‐‑case/.        
   10.     26  U.S.C.A  §  5000A(a)  (West  2010).  
   11.     26  U.S.C.A  §  5000A(b)(1)  (West  2010).  
   12.     Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2584.  
   13.     Id.  
   14.     Id.  
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Clause15   but,   nevertheless,   is   constitutional   under   the   Taxing  
Power.16  
This   Article   explores   the   majority   decision   regarding   the  
individual  mandate.    Specifically,  the  question  is  asked:  Can  the  
Taxing  Power  render  constitutional  an  act,  that  if  not  framed  as  a  
tax,   is   beyond   the   scope   of   the   Federal   government’s  
enumerated  powers?  
CONGRESS  LACKS  POWER  TO  “COMPEL”  COMMERCE  
The  Constitution  provides   that  Congress   shall   have  power  
to  “regulate  commerce  .  .  .  among  the  several  States.”17    Over  the  
years,  Commerce  Clause  authority  has  evolved   to  be  extremely  
broad.18    In  Sebelius,  the  Federal  Government  argued  that  failure  
to   purchase   health   insurance   creates   a   substantial   detrimental  
effect   on   interstate   commerce   by   shifting   to   others   the   health  
care   costs   of   those   who   cannot   afford   health   insurance.19    
Therefore,   regulating   health   insurance   by   means   of   the  
individual  mandate  is  valid  under  the  Commerce  Clause.20    The  
Court   pointed   out,   however,   that   the   Commerce   Clause  
historically  has  encompassed  only  existing  commercial  activity.21    
In   contrast,   the   ACA   “compels   individuals   to   become   active   in  
commerce   by   purchasing   a   product.”22      In   the   end,   the   Court  
stated   that   the   “Framers   gave   Congress   the   power   to   regulate  
commerce,   not   to   compel   it,   and   for   over   200   years   both   our  
decisions   and   Congress’s   actions   have   reflected   this  
understanding.      There   is   no   reason   to   depart   from   that  
 
   15.     Id.  at  2593.  
   16.     Id.  at  2600.  
   17.     U.S.  CONST.  art.  I,  §  8,  cl.  3.  
   18.     See   United   States   v.   Darby,   312   U.S.   100,   118-­‐‑19   (1940)   (holding   that  
Commerce  Clause  power  not  only  grants  federal  regulatory  power  over  commerce  
between  the  states,  but  extends  that  power  to  activity  deemed  to  have  a  substantial  
effect  on  interstate  commerce,  even  if  the  activity  is  confined  within  a  single  state).  
   19.     Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2585.  
   20.     Id.    
   21.     Id.  at  2586.  
   22.     Id.  at  2587.  
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understanding  now.”23      Rejecting   the  Government’s  Commerce  
Clause  theory,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  “individual  mandate  forces  
individuals  into  commerce  precisely  because  they  elected  to  refrain  
from   commercial   activity,”   therefore,   the   “law   cannot   be  
sustained  under”  the  Commerce  Clause.24  
STIPULATED:  THE  INDIVIDUAL  MANDATE  IS  A  TAX  
Having   ruled   the   individual  mandate  beyond   the   scope  of  
the   Commerce   Clause,25   the   Court   then   turned   to   the  
Government’s   Taxing   Power   argument.   Interestingly,   the  
primary   debate   between   the  majority   and   the   dissent   centered  
on  whether  the  individual  mandate  was,  in  reality,  a  penalty  or  a  
tax.26    While  the  point  is  certainly  debatable,  this  Article  accepts  
the  majority   ruling   that   the   individual  mandate  can   reasonably  
be  interpreted  as  a  tax.  
ANALYSIS  
THE  FORGOTTEN  “PROHIBITED  PRETEXT  DOCTRINE”  
We   now   arrive   at   the   question   to   which   this   Article   is  
dedicated.    Specifically,  can  powers  otherwise  beyond  the  scope  
of  the  Constitution  be  rendered  constitutional  solely  by  framing  
them  as  a  tax?    A  review  of  various  well-­‐‑known  Supreme  Court  
cases   reveals   that   this   question   is   not   a   novel   one.      Over   the  
years,   the   Court   has   heard   a   number   of   cases   in   which   it  
examined   federal   laws   to  determine   if   the  national  government  
had  overstepped  its  authority  through  the  purported  use  of  the  
Taxing   Power.      Several   prominent   cases   establish   the  
fundamental  principle  that  “attainment  of  a  prohibited  end  may  
not  be  accomplished  under  the  pretext  of  the  exertion  of  powers  
 
   23.     Id.  at  2589.  
   24.     Id.  at  2591  (emphasis  added).  
   25.     Id.  at  2593.  
   26.     Id.  at  2594;  see  also  id.,  at  2650-­‐‑51  (Scalia,  J.  dissenting).  
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which  are  granted”27  and  if  Congress  passes  a  law  seeking  to  do  
so,  it  is  the  Court’s  “painful  duty”28  to  declare  that  such  a  law  is  
“invalid   and   cannot   be   enforced.”29      Moving   forward,   this  
established   rule  of   law   is   referred   to   as   the   “Prohibited  Pretext  
Doctrine”.  
Origins  of  the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  
The   Prohibited   Pretext  Doctrine’s   foundation  was   laid   out  
in  McCulloch  v.  Maryland.30    In  that  case,  the  Supreme  Court  held  
that  the  power  to  organize  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  though  
not  expressly  granted,  was  an  “incidental  power[]”31  within  the  
scope   of   the   Constitution.      However,   the   Court   acknowledged  
that   the   government   remained   one   of   limited   powers,   and   “its  
limits   are   not   to   be   transcended.”32      Regarding   Congress’  
implied  powers,  the  Court  stated  “[l]et  the  end  be  legitimate,  let  
it   be  within   the   scope  of   the   constitution,   and  all  means  which  
are  appropriate,  which  are  plainly  adapted  to  that  end,  which  are  
not   prohibited,   but   consistent   with   the   letter   and   spirit   of   the  
constitution.”33  
Further  Development  of  the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  
A   century   after  McCulloch,   the   Supreme   Court   developed  
the   Prohibited   Pretext   Doctrine   further.      In   Bailey   v.   Drexel  
Furniture   Co.,   the   Court   examined   the   constitutionality   of   the  
Child   Labor   Tax   Law.34      The   law   assessed   a   large   tax   on   any  
business  that  employed  children  under  a  certain  age.35    The  law  
was  challenged  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  actually  a  regulation  
 
   27.     United  States  v.  Butler,  297  U.S.  1,  68  (1936).    
   28.     McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  17  U.S.  316,  423  (1819).  
   29.     Linder  v.  United  States,  268  U.S.  5,  17  (1926).  
   30.     17  U.S.  316.    
   31.     Id.  at  420-­‐‑21.  
   32.     Id.  at  421.  
   33.     Id.  (emphasis  added).  
   34.     259  U.S.  20,  34  (1922).  
   35.     Id.  at  34-­‐‑35.  
HASTINGS  MACRO.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   5/19/14    10:21  PM  
234   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
of   child   labor,   a   power   considered,   at   the   time,   to   reside  
exclusively  with  the  States.36    The  Federal  Government  defended  
the   law   as   “a   mere   excise   tax   levied   by   the   Congress   of   the  
United   States   under   its   broad   power   of   taxation.”37      The  
Supreme  Court  struck  down  the  law  stating  that  “the  provisions  
of   the   so-­‐‑called   taxing   act”   were   dedicated   “solely   to   the  
achievement   of   some   other   purpose”   not   otherwise  within   the  
power  of  the  Federal  Government.  38  
Explicit  Pronouncement  of  the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  
In   United   States   v.   Butler,   the   Court   considered   the  
constitutionality   of   a   tax   imposed   by   the   Agricultural  
Adjustment  Act  of  1933  (“AAA”).39    Due  to  the  severe  economic  
difficulties  of  the  Great  Depression,  the  AAA  sought  to  increase  
the   market   price   of   farm   commodities.40      The   AAA   aimed   to  
accomplish   this   by   persuading   individual   farmers   to   refrain  
from   planting   certain   crops,   thereby   lowering   production.41    
Farmers  who   voluntarily   agreed   to   refrain   from   planting  were  
paid   “rental   or   benefit   payments”   derived   from   a   tax   on  
processors   of   that   commodity.42      The   tax   was   challenged   and  
ultimately  ruled  unconstitutional  because   it  sought  to  “regulate  
and   control   agricultural   production”43   (again,   a   power   deemed  
beyond  the  scope  of  the  Commerce  Clause  in  1936)  by  utilizing  a  
tax  as  a  “means  to  an  unconstitutional  end.”44    The  Butler  Court  
stated  that  it  was  “an  established  principle  that  the  attainment  of  
a   prohibited   end  may   not   be   accomplished  under   the   pretext   of  
the   exertion   of   powers  which   are  granted.”45     More   specifically,   the  
 
   36.     Id.  at  36.  
   37.     Id.  
   38.     Id.  at  43.  
   39.     297  U.S.  1,  53  (1935).  
   40.     Id.  at  53-­‐‑54.  
   41.     Id.  at  54-­‐‑55.  
   42.     Id.  
   43.     Id.  at  68.  
   44.     Id.  
   45.     Id.  (emphasis  added).  
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Court   ruled   that   the   Federal   Government   may   not   “indirectly  
accomplish  those  [prohibited]  ends  by  taxing  .  .  .  .”46  
It   is   important   to   note   that   in   striking   down   the   law,   the  
Butler  Court   simultaneously   recognized   the   expansive   scope   of  
the  Taxing  Power.47    Settling  a  debate  dating  back  to  the  time  of  
Alexander   Hamilton   and   James   Madison,   the   Court   adopted  
Hamilton’s  view  that  the  ability  to  tax  is  “a  power  separate  and  
distinct”   from   the   other   powers   enumerated   in   the  
Constitution.48  However,  as  recognized  in  Butler,   this  expansive  
view   is   not   at   odds   with   the   Prohibited   Pretext   Doctrine.    
Indeed,   modern   scholars   accept   Butler,   when   viewed   in   its  
entirety,  as  establishing  that  Congress  has  power  to  tax  “for  any  
purpose  that   it  believe[s]  serve[s]   the  general  welfare,  so   long  as  
Congress  [does]  not  violate  another  constitutional  provision”  in  doing  
so.49    To  summarize,  although  the  power  of  taxation  is  expansive  
under   Butler,   Congress   may   not   ignore   the   effect   of   a   taxing  
provision,  if  the  effect  is  the  attainment  of  a  prohibited  end.  
The  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  Remains  Valid  Law  
It   is,   of   course,   true   that   the   laws   invalidated   in   Drexel  
Furniture   and   Butler   would   very   likely   be   upheld   in   modern  
courts.      However,   it   is   not   because   the   Prohibited   Pretext  
Doctrine  has  been  rejected  or  overruled.    Rather,  it  is  because  the  
Commerce   Clause   has   evolved   to   extend   to   Congress   certain  
powers  deemed  prohibited  at   the   time   the  Drexel  Furniture   and  
Butler   rulings   were   handed   down.      In   other   words,   under  
modern   Commerce   Clause   interpretation,   Congress   would   not  
be   using   the   Taxing   Power   as   a   pretext   to   accomplish   a  
 
   46.     Id.  at  74  (emphasis  added).  
   47.     Erwin  Chemerinsky,  Protecting   the  Spending  Power,   4  CHAP.  L.  REV.   89,   91  
(2001).  
   48.     Butler,  297  U.S.  at  65.  
   49.     ERWIN  CHEMERINSKY,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW,  280  (Wolters  Kluwer  Law  &  
Business,  4th   ed.  2011);   “In   light  of   the  narrowing  of  Congress’s   commerce  power,  
some  have  urged   similar   restrictions   on  Congress’s   spending  power   and   even   an  
overruling   of  United   States   v.   Butler’s   expansive   interpretation   of   [the   taxing   and  
spending  clauses].”  Id.    
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prohibited  end,  because   regulation  of   labor   and  agriculture  are  
now  considered  within  the  scope  of  the  Commerce  Clause.    As  a  
consequence   of   the   expansive   modern   interpretation   of   the  
Commerce  Clause,  violations  of  the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  
became  exceedingly   rare   in   the  post-­‐‑Lochner   era.     Nevertheless,  
the  constitutional  principle  has  neither  died  nor  been  overruled,  
but  appears  to  have  been  forgotten  or  overlooked.  
In   an   oblique   reference   to   the   Prohibited   Pretext  Doctrine,  
the  Court   states,   “Congress’s   ability   to   use   its   taxing   power   to  
influence   conduct   is   not   without   limits.      A   few   of   our   cases  
policed   these   limits   aggressively,   invalidating   punitive   exactions  
obviously  designed   to   regulate   behavior   otherwise   regarded   at  
the   time   as   beyond   federal   authority.”50      In   making   this  
statement   the   Court   cites   to   Butler   and   Drexel   Furniture.    
However,   the  Court   immediately   dismisses   both   cases,   stating,  
“[W]e  have  declined  to  closely  examine  the  regulatory  motive  or  
effect   of   revenue-­‐‑raising   measures.”51      Unfortunately,   these  
statements  do  more  to  blur  the  analysis  than  to  clarify  it.  
By  stating   that  past  cases   invalidated  punitive   exactions,   the  
implication   is   that   the  Court   invalidated  the   taxes   in  Butler  and  
Drexel   Furniture   solely   because   they   were,   in   reality,   penalties  
and   not   taxes.      While   this   implication   is   quite   useful   to   the  
majority   in   the   instant   case   (after   all,   the   primary   debate  
regarding   the   individual   mandate   was   whether   the   exaction  
called  for  was  a  tax  or  a  penalty),  it  is  simply  not  true.    The  Butler  
opinion,   for   example,   contains   no   argument   that   the   exaction  
called   for   by   the   AAA   was   so   punitive   as   to   be   a   penalty.    
Nevertheless,   the  Butler  Court   invalidated   the  AAA   tax,   stating  
that   Congress   had   “under   the   pretext   of   exercising   the   taxing  
power,  in  reality  accomplishe[d]  prohibited  ends.”52  
While   it   is   true   that   Drexel   Furniture   was   a   case   that  
analyzed  whether  a  so-­‐‑called  “tax”  was  in  reality  a  penalty,  the  
 
   50.     Nat’l  Fed’n  of  Indep.  Bus.  v.  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  2566,  2599  (2012)(emphasis  
added).    
   51.     Id.  
   52.     United  States  v.  Butler,  297  U.S.  1,  77  (1936).  
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case   did   not   overrule   the   Prohibited   Pretext   Doctrine.   To   the  
contrary,  Drexel   Furniture   established,   among  other   things,   that  
arbitrary   labeling   is   one   of   various   “pretexts”   that  may   not   be  
employed   by   Congress   in   an   effort   to   “adopt  measures   which  
are  prohibited  by  the  Constitution.”53  
Some   might   argue   that   Supreme   Court   cases   following  
Butler  effectively  overrule   the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine.     The  
Court  implies  as  much  when  it  cites  to  United  States  v.  Kahriger.54    
A  brief   historical   examination  of   the   cases   collected   in  Kahriger  
reveals,  however,  that  this  is  not  so.    As  an  initial  matter,  four  of  
the   six   cases   collected   in   Kahriger   pre-­‐‑date   Butler’s   explicit  
pronouncement   of   the   Prohibited   Pretext   Doctrine55   and,  
therefore,  cannot  reasonably  be  viewed  as  overruling  it.  
The   remaining   two   collected   cases   are   also   unhelpful.      In  
Sonzinsky   v.   United   States,   the   Supreme   Court   examined   the  
constitutionality   of   an   excise   tax   levied   on   firearms   dealers.56    
The   Court   ruled   that   the   excise   tax   was   “within   the   national  
taxing   power”   because   it   “operate[d]   as   a   tax”   and   was   “not  
attended   by   an   offensive   regulation.”57      This   language   does   not  
overrule   the   Prohibited   Pretext   Doctrine;   to   the   contrary,   it  
validates   it.      In   essence,   the   Sonzinsky   Court   is   saying   that  
because   the   levy   could   reasonably   be   viewed   as   a   tax,   and  
because   the   taxing   measure   was   not   accompanied   by   an  
offensive  regulation  (i.e.  no  pretext),  the  law  was  an  appropriate  
use  of  the  Taxing  Power.58  
The   final   case,  United   States   v.   Sanchez,   involved   a   tax   on  
anyone   who   “imports,   manufactures,   produces,   compounds,  
sells,  deals   in,  dispenses,  prescribes,  administers,  or  gives  away  
 
   53.     Bailey  v.  Drexel  Furniture  Co.,  259  U.S.  20,  40  (1922)  (quoting  McCulloch  v.  
Maryland,  17  U.S.  316,  423  (1819)).      
   54.     345  U.S.  22  (1953).    
   55.     Id.   at  27-­‐‑31   (The   four  cases   referred   to  are:  Veazie  Bank  v.  Fenno,  75  U.S.  
533  (1869);  McCray  v.  United  States,  195  U.S.  27  (1903);  United  States  v.  Doremus,  
249  U.S.86  (1918);  Nigro  v.  United  States,  276  U.S.  332  (1927)).  
   56.     300  U.S.  506,  511  (1937).  
   57.     Id.  at  514.  (emphasis  added).  
   58.     Id.  
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mari[j]uana.”59    The  Court  upheld  the  tax.60    However,  one  must  
remember   that   this   ruling   came   after   the   seminal   1942   case   of  
Wickard   v.   Filburn   in   which   the   Court   adopted   the   expansive  
post-­‐‑Lochner   Commerce   Clause   interpretation.61      Therefore,   the  
Court  could  not  invalidate  the  tax  for  inappropriately  regulating  
marijuana.62      In   other   words,   following   Wickard,   growing   or  
dealing   in   marijuana   was   certainly   within   the   scope   of   the  
Commerce  Clause,  and  therefore  a  tax  on  this  activity  would  not  
be  a  violation  of  the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine.  
While  it  is  true  that  “more  recently  [courts]  have  declined  to  
closely   examine   the   regulatory   motive   or   effect   of   revenue-­‐‑
raising   measures,”63   it   is   not   because   the   Prohibited   Pretext  
Doctrine  is  bad  law  or  has  been  overruled.    Rather,  it  is  because,  
until   Sebelius,   there   were   few   activities   in   the   post-­‐‑Lochner   era  
deemed  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Commerce  Clause.64  
THE  PROHIBITED  PRETEXT  DOCTRINE  AND  THE  INDIVIDUAL  
MANDATE  
In   Sebelius,   the   Supreme   Court   states   that   the   “individual  
mandate   forces   individuals   into   commerce”   and,   therefore,  
cannot  be  sustained  by  the  Commerce  Clause.65  Additionally,  the  
Court  states,  “[t]he  Framers  gave  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  
commerce,  not  to  compel  it.”66    The  Court’s  language  on  this  issue  
is  quite  explicit;  Congress  does  not  have  the  power  to  compel  its  
 
   59.     340  U.S.  42,  43  (1950).  
   60.     Id.  at  45.  
   61.     317  U.S.  111,  124,  128-­‐‑29  (1942).  
   62.     Sanchez,  340  U.S.  at  44-­‐‑45.  
   63.     Nat’l  Fed’n  of  Indep.  Bus.  v.  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  2566,  2599  (2012).  
   64.     Id.   at   2585-­‐‑86   (The   author  does  not   suggest   that   a   tax   is   only   valid   if   the  
activity   being   taxed   falls   within   the   scope   of   the   Commerce   Clause.      The   salient  
point   is   that   Congress  may   not   use   the   taxing   power   as   a   pretext   to   accomplish,  
otherwise   prohibited   ends.     As   detailed   in   §   IV   following,   the  majority   expressly  
states   that   Congress  may   not   compel   commerce.   Nevertheless,   the   court’s   ruling  
allows   Congress   to   compel   commerce   under   the   pretext   that   the   compulsion   be  
ignored  so  long  as  it  is  accomplished  by  way  of  taxation).  
   65.     Id.  at  2591.  
   66.     Id.  at  2589.  
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citizens  to  buy  a  product.67    If  the  Federal  Government  had  such  
power,   said   the   Court,   “many   of   the   provisions   [of]   the  
Constitution   would   be   superfluous.”68      However,   the   majority  
goes   on   to   say   that   the   “Government   does   not   claim   that   the  
taxing   power   allows   Congress   to”   force   people   to   buy   health  
insurance.69      Instead,   it  asks   the  Court   to   interpret   the  mandate  
as   doing   nothing  more   than   “imposing   a   tax   on   those  who  do  
not   buy   that   product.”70      As   previously   noted,   the   Supreme  
Court   rejected   this   very   argument   nearly   ninety   years   ago   in  
Drexel  Furniture.71  
The   similarities   between  Drexel   Furniture   and   Sebelius   are  
quite   striking.      In   both   cases   the   government   endeavored   to  
impose  its  will  upon  the  people  through  its  Taxing  Power.72      In  
both  cases,  the  Court  recognized  that  the  true  purpose  of  the  tax  
was   to  compel  certain  activity.73      In  both  cases,   the  Court   ruled  
that   the   power   sought   by   the   government   was   beyond   the  
Commerce   Clause.74      Yet,   the   Court   struck   down   the   law   in  
Drexel  Furniture,  but  upheld  the  individual  mandate  in  Sebelius.75    
How   can   this   be?      The   answer   lies   in   the  Court’s   creation   of   a  
new  and  potentially  far  reaching  doctrine,  referred  to  here  as  the  
“Sebelius  Theory.”     Specifically,   the  Sebelius  Theory  allows   the  
Court   to   “interpret   the   mandate   as   imposing   a   tax,   if   it   would  
otherwise  violate  the  Constitution.”76  
As   such,   the   Sebelius   Theory   turns   the   Prohibited   Pretext  
Doctrine  on   its  head.      Instead  of  barring   the   indirect  exercise  of  
prohibited  powers   through   the  pretext  of   a  power  granted,   the  
Sebelius   Theory   explicitly   allows   the   exercise   of   prohibited  
powers  by  pretext,   so   long  as   the  pretext  employed   is   to   frame  
 
   67.     See  id.  
   68.     Id.  at  2586.  
   69.     Id.  at  2593.  
   70.     Id.  at  2573.  
   71.     Bailey  v.  Drexel  Furniture  Co.,  259  U.S.  20,  43-­‐‑44  (1922).  
   72.     Id.  at  36;  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2580,  2599.  
   73.     Drexel  Furniture,  259  U.S.  at  39-­‐‑40;  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2594,  2596.  
   74.     Drexel  Furniture,  259  U.S.  at  38;  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2591.  
   75.     Drexel  Furniture,  259  U.S.  at  44;  Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2608.    
   76.     Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2594  (emphasis  added).  
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the   applicable   law   as   a   tax.      Stated   differently,   the   Sebelius  
Theory   effectively   removes   the   requirement   established   in  
Butler,   that   to   be   valid,   a   tax   must   not   violate   another  
constitutional  provision.    In  its  place,  the  Sebelius  Theory  grants  
Congress  the  ability  to  simply  ignore  violations  of  constitutional  
provisions   so   long   as   the   associated   law   can   reasonably   be  
interpreted  as  a  tax.  
Prophetically,   the   Drexel   Furniture   Court   stated   that   if   a  
proposition,   such   as   the   one   espoused   in   the   Sebelius   Theory,  
were   accepted   “all   that   Congress   would   need   to   do,  
hereafter,  .  .  .   would   be   to   enact   a   detailed   measure  .  .  .   and  
enforce   it   by   a   so-­‐‑called   tax  .  .  .   [t]o   give   such   magic   to   the   word  
‘tax’  would  be  to  break  down  all  constitutional  limitation  of  the  powers  
of  Congress  and  completely  wipe  out  the  sovereignty  of  the  States.”77  
The  Drexel  Furniture  prophecy  is  fulfilled  in  Sebelius.    Under  
the   Sebelius   Theory,   it   is   nearly   impossible   to   identify   any  
legislation   that   would   be   unconstitutional,   if   framed   as   a   tax.    
For   example,   suppose   Congress   passed   a   law   mandating   that  
every   person   attend   a   particular   religious   service   at   least   once  
per  month.    Failure  to  do  so  would  result  in  the  imposition  of  a  
tax.    Is  there  any  doubt  that  such  a  law  is  a  violation  of  the  First  
Amendment?      However,   under   the   Sebelius   Theory,   the  
Government   would   argue   “that   the   taxing   power   [does   not  
allow]   Congress   to   [compel   church   attendance].   Instead,   the  
Government   asks   [the   court]   to   read   the   mandate   not   as  
ordering   individual   [   ]   [church   attendance],   but   rather   as  
imposing   a   tax   on   those  who  do  not   [attend   church].”78      Is   the  
mandate   any   less   compulsory   because   it   is   framed   as   a   tax?    
Does   the   “tax”   designation   cure   the   statute’s   violation   of  
constitutional   principles?      Is   it   reasonable   to   disregard   the  
underlying   purpose   or   effect   of   the   law   simply   because   the  
exaction   is   a   tax?      In   Sebelius,   the   majority   appears   to   have  
answered  each  of  these  questions  in  the  affirmative.  
Herein   lies   the   fatal   flaw   of   the   Sebelius   Theory,   for   this  
 
   77.     Drexel  Furniture,  259  U.S.  at  38  (emphasis  added).  
   78.     Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2593.    
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method  of  analysis  can  be  applied  to  any  imaginable  legislative  
enactment.      Suppose  Congress  passed  a   law   imposing  a   tax  on  
homeowners   for   failure   to   finance   their   home   through   the  
Federal   National   Mortgage   Association.79      Consider   a   tax  
imposed   for   not  maintaining   a   healthy   body  weight   or   for   not  
purchasing  an  electric  car.     Suppose  the  government  imposed  a  
tax  on  abortion  procedures  or  passed  a  tax  on  families  who  had  
more  than  two  children.    What  if  Congress  mandated  that  every  
citizen  surrender  all  firearms,  or  be  subject  to  a  tax?    Some  might  
argue   that   Congress   would   never   enact   such   extreme   laws.    
While  that  may  be  true,  it  would  not  be  the  Constitution  holding  
Congress  back.    After  all,  under  the  Sebelius  Theory,  each  of  the  
hypothetical   laws   would   be   viewed   as   nothing   more   than   the  
imposition   of   a   tax,   and   therefore   not   a   violation   of  
Constitutional   limits.      Using   the   Court’s   own   words,   the  
unavoidable   result   of   applying   the   Sebelius   Theory   is   to  
fundamentally  change  “the  relation  between  the  citizen  and  the  
Federal  Government”  granting  the  latter  the  power  in  all  things  
to  “compel  citizens  to  act  as   the  Government  would  have  them  
act.”80  
Additionally,   some   might   rebut   this   analysis   by   pointing  
out   that  a   few  of   the  hypothesized   laws   touch  on  Bill  of  Rights  
issues,   and   are   therefore   distinguishable   from   the   individual  
mandate.      One   must   remember,   however,   that   under   the  
Sebelius   Theory   the   law  would   “be   read   to   do   [nothing]  more  
than  impose  a  tax”  in  order  to  sustain  it.81    The  Sebelius  ruling  is  
devoid   of   any   language   exempting   Bill   of   Rights   issues   from  
application   of   the   newly   formed   cannon   of   legislative  
interpretation   established   in   the   Sebelius   Theory.      To   the  
contrary,   as   mentioned   previously,   the   Sebelius   Theory  
unequivocally   allows   Congress   to   ignore   violations   of  
constitutional   principles   so   long   as   taxation   is   the   means   of  
 
   79.     The  Federal  National  Mortgage  Associations,  commonly  known  as  Fannie  
Mae,   is   a   government-­‐‑backed   enterprise   that   purchases   mortgages   from   lenders,  
pools  them  together,  and  sells  the  pools  to  investors.  
   80.     Sebelius,  132  S.  Ct.  at  2589.    
   81.     Id.  at  2598.  
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accomplishing  the  otherwise  prohibited  end.  
In  effect,   the  Sebelius  Theory  establishes   the  Taxing  Power  
as   a   saving   clause   to   virtually   any   legislation   that   would  
otherwise   be   considered   unconstitutional.      To   accept   such   a  
theory   is   to   accept   the   proposition   that   the   Taxing   Power   is  
virtually  limitless  and  can  potentially  trump  all  other  protections  
in  the  Constitution,  whether  express  or  implied.    To  accept  such  
a  theory  is  to  accept  that  there  is  but  one  check  on  Congressional  
power:  that  laws  be  framed  as  a  tax  if  they  otherwise  violate  the  
Constitution.  
CONCLUSION  
The  purpose  of   this  Article   is  not   to  pass   judgment  on   the  
wisdom  or  effectiveness  of  the  ACA.    Providing  solutions  to  the  
nation’s   health   care   challenges   is   certainly   an   important  
endeavor.    Rather,  the  purpose  of  this  Article  is  to  point  out  the  
dangers   the   new   Sebelius   Theory   poses   to   the   liberties   and  
protections   that   are   hallmarks   of   our   union   of   sovereign,   but  
united,  states.  
Few  would  dispute  that  passage  of  the  ACA  was  one  of  the  
most   partisan   and   bitter   political   battles   in   recent   legislative  
history.      The   Sebelius   ruling   is   likewise   the   focus   of   a   wide  
spectrum   of   passionate   and   differing   opinions.      Some  
constitutional   scholars   have   heralded   the   Supreme   Court’s  
ruling  as  a  brilliant  stroke  of  judicial  statesmanship,  akin  to  that  
found   in  Marbury   v.   Madison.82      Others   have   pointed   out   the  
disturbing   aspects   of   the   ruling,   especially   those   related   to   the  
seemingly   contradictory   holdings   regarding   the   individual  
mandate.83     Be   it  brilliant,  disturbing,  or  something   in  between,  
the  Sebelius  ruling  is  now  part  of  our  judicial  history.  
Does   the   ruling   expand   the   Federal  Government’s   already  
expansive   power   of   taxation?      Will   the   Sebelius   Theory   be  
 
   82.     Bradley  Joondeph,  A  Marbury  for  our  Time,  SCOTUSBLOG  (June  29,  2012),  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-­‐‑marbury-­‐‑for-­‐‑our-­‐‑time/.  
   83.     Erwin   Chemerinsky,   A   Surprise?,   SCOTUSBLOG   (June   29,   2012),  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-­‐‑surprise/.  
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invoked  as  precedent  to  enact  laws  related  to  other  controversial  
topics   such   as   gun   control,   abortion,   climate   change,   and   same  
sex  marriage?    If  so,  how  far  will  the  Court  go  in  extending  the  
Sebelius  Theory   to  validate  otherwise  prohibited  governmental  
action?    Only  time  will  tell.  
The   overarching   question   is   this:   In   a   nation   where   the  
power  of   the  Federal  Government  seems   to  be  ever  expanding,  
where   must   one   draw   the   line   if   the   idea   of   a   Federal  
Government  of  limited  and  enumerated  powers  is  to  endure?    In  
reflecting   upon   this   old   and   important   question,   the   words   of  
the   honorable   Chief   Justice   John   Marshall   provide   profound  
insight:  
The  powers  of   the   legislature  are  defined,  and  limited;  
and  that  those  limits  may  not  be  mistaken,  or  forgotten,  
the  constitution  is  written.  To  what  purpose  are  powers  
limited,   and   to   what   purpose   is   that   limitation  
committed   to  writing,   if   these   limits  may,  at  any   time,  
be   passed   by   those   intended   to   be   restrained?   The  
distinction,   between   a   government   with   limited   and  
unlimited   powers,   is   abolished,   if   those   limits   do   not  
confine  the  persons  on  whom  they  are  imposed,  and  if  
acts   prohibited   and   acts   allowed,   are   of   equal  
obligation.84  
I   submit   that  Congress   exceeded   its  Constitutional   bounds  
in  passing   the  ACA,  and   the  Supreme  Court   erred  by   ignoring  
the  Prohibited  Pretext  Doctrine  and  creating  an  unconstitutional  
standard  in  the  Sebelius  Theory.    For  the  first  time  in  over  eighty  
years   the   Court   should   have   invoked   the   Prohibited   Pretext  
Doctrine,  for  the  Sebelius  ruling  itself  acknowledges  that  through  
the   ACA   the   government   seeks   attainment   of   an   explicitly  
prohibited  end—that  of  compelling  its  citizens  into  commerce—
through   the  pretextual  use  of   the  Taxing  Power.     Allowing   the  
Federal   Government   to   do   so   inappropriately   usurps   a   power  




   84.     Marbury  v.  Madison,  5  U.S.  137,  176-­‐‑77  (1803).  
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